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ABSTRACT 
 
The present project aims at presenting the partial equilibrium of a modeled positive theory 
which describes the tradeoff the firms face in the hiring processes for vacancies that do not 
require high or specific level of education between the expected productivity and quitting 
rates of the candidates subject to their level of education. The basis of the theory is a 
performed experiment, by sector and geographically limited, to 20 retail and restoration firms 
in Catalonia and to 5 temporary employment agencies. The results lead to the affirmation that 
the hiring strategies used by the surveyed firms are, in fact, direct contributors to the 
enhancement of the overqualification problem, mostly in temporary positions. Due to general 
assumptions in the demand side about the implications of the candidates’ education level, the 
surveyed retail and restoration firms prefer overqualified candidates for temporary vacancies 
and not overqualified candidates for indefinite vacancies. Firms face a tradeoff between the 
candidates’ productivity and quitting rates when the vacancy is temporary but has some 
probability of being converted into an indefinite one.  
 
 
 
Keywords: level of education, overqualification, hiring strategies, temporary vacancies, 
indefinite vacancies, vacancies that do not require high or specific level of education, positive 
theory 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The mismatch in the labor market regarding education is present both in Spain and Catalonia, 
and most of the research point at the maladjustment of education in comparison to the needs 
of the labor market of the country as the principal cause of this mismatch. While secondary 
students are encourage to engage in superior studies, many vacancies in the Spanish and 
Catalan labor market require only primary studies and job experience, which causes that once 
graduated students from superior studies enter the labor market, very often they will be 
performing tasks or will be covering a vacancy that does not require the level of education 
they possess.  
Most explanations and studies about the matching processes between candidates and 
vacancies have focused on the supply side, mainly about the effect of being unemployed for a 
certain period of time, strategies to search for a job, the variables that contribute to excel in 
job interviews, the characteristics of the candidates that affect the selection process, among 
others.  However, not many theories have been created about the demand side, which is why 
this project is focused on it to try to comprehend which is the role of firms and how they 
contribute to the enhancement of the qualification mismatch.  
With this social and economic problem in mind, and with my own personal experience in the 
labor market, a question to focus on was perceived. This project aims at addressing how this 
qualification mismatch, specifically overqualification, is encouraged by the firms’ hiring 
strategies, and how it is displayed in temporary compared to indefinite job positions for 
vacancies that do not require a high or specific level of education.  
Before proceeding, I would like to properly clarify which are the types of vacancies that I am 
interested in and the ones that are not going to be studied. When the expression “high or 
specific level of education” is used, it refers to vacancies that require high or tertiary 
education, but also to those that require specific knowledge and skills acquired through in-
the-job training, vocational training (in Catalan called Formació Professional) or other types 
of courses. Vacancies as a hairdresser, a beautician, a mechanic or a butcher can be examples 
of those jobs that require a specific level of education, and examples of the vacancies I am 
not going to study.   
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1.1. Objectives, research question and methodology  
The general objectives for this project are:  
● Study the firms’ hiring strategies for vacancies that do not require a high or specific 
level of education to understand whether and how these strategies may cause 
overqualification in the current Spanish labor market. 
● Determine how the candidate’s level of education (whether its studies are directly 
related to the specific vacancy or not) influence the selecting process. 
● Comprehend whether the length of the contract of the vacancy is a factor to be taken 
into account when choosing among different candidates for a job position that does 
not require a high or specific level of education. 
 
The specific objectives for this project are:  
● Present the previous empirical evidence and studies made in this field to be able to 
define the research question and assumptions that are going to be used to create a 
theory  
● Clearly define an experiment to be executed in different firms in order to obtain data 
and information so as to create a simplified positive theory that can define the hiring 
strategies of those firms looking for candidates to cover vacancies that do not require 
a high or specific level of education.   
● Analyze the results obtained throughout the experiment and the theory developed in 
order to draw conclusions 
 
Therefore, the research question this project wants to address is:    
 
How does the level of education of the candidates affect the firms’ hiring strategies for 
temporary versus indefinite vacancies that do not require a high or specific level of 
education?  
 
To achieve these objectives and answer the posed question, first I am going to review the 
previous empirical evidence and main studies made about the mismatch problem in the labor 
market delving into the overqualification issue. In this first part of bibliographic research, I 
am going to mention the contrasted differences of the overqualification problem in temporary 
vacancies compared to indefinite ones. Furthermore, I also want to work on the assumptions 
or prejudices in the demand side and the response from the supply side to them that may 
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contribute to the enhancement of the overqualification problem. This information and the 
research question are going to be the basis to develop the experiment to carry out to different 
firms. Once the experiment is completed, a theory is going to be presented that encompasses 
the results and data found in the experiment. Some of the previous assumptions are going to 
be included in the theory to simplify it and to better explain and cover the variables I am 
really interested in.  
To finalize the project, some conclusions are going to be drawn about the results achieved 
both with the experiment and the model produced and some comments are going to be 
written about how this study could be further developed or improved.  
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2. PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
2.1. Mismatch in the labor market 
The labor market mismatch, not only occurring in Spain but also in other developed 
economies such as Italy, Ireland, Czech Republic and Austria, is caused by inadequate levels 
of education, the inflexibility in the labor market and the salary pressures of the highly 
qualified candidates as stated by the Hays Global Skills Index 2013, elaborated by the British 
multinational Hays together with Oxford Economics. When the mismatch problem is 
temporary, it directly depends on the period of the economic cycle the country is facing, 
therefore, is natural that it is higher in recessive phases and lower in expansive phases (Ivie 
and Bancaja, 2009); and, although the Spanish labor market follows a similar pattern, the 
mismatch problem is not temporary nor a consequence of the current economic crisis.  
The matching frictions in the Spanish labor market are more than obvious, with an 
unemployment rate of 20.9% and a total of 58.868 job vacancies in the last trimester of 2015 
according to the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE). Part of those frictions could be 
explained due to the fact that the candidates are not adequate to perform or cover the job 
vacancies demanded by the firms. According to the 2012 Randstad report, in each selection 
process between 800 and 1.300 candidates apply but, still, the 43% of the vacancies are not 
covered because firms do not find what they need in those candidates. Therefore, it is not a 
surprise that the number of selection process failures accounts for 60%.   
The report published in 2014 by the IESE Business School “Armonizar educación y empleo 
en España. Reto en 5 años” points at the structure and rigidity of the Spanish education 
system as the responsible for creating candidates with high level of education that do not 
match with the requirements of the firms. Moreover, the candidates do not have the 
communication skills nor the needed emotional intelligence that the labor market is 
demanding.  
This paper is going to be focused on the qualification mismatch, understood as the mismatch 
between the educational qualifications held by a worker and those required by his job. The 
qualification mismatch emerges in the market because of the adjustments lags of firms, the 
wage rigidities, the adjustments lags of education system, the frictions in the matching 
process and the imperfect information between the applicant and the firm in the selection 
process (Quintini, 2011). A relevant problem between education and labor market becomes 
apparent when we realize that the unemployment rate is significantly higher for people with 
low level of education than for those with a high one:  
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Graph 1. Spanish unemployment rate of population between 25-64 years old by level of 
education in 2014 
 
Source: own elaboration with INE data (Encuesta de la Población Activa) 
 
Graph 2. Unemployment rate of population of European countries between 25-64 years old 
by level of education attained in 2014  
 
Source: own elaboration with EUROSTAT data 
 
The reason behind this difference in the unemployment rate taking into account that is the 
high educated population the one that does not match with the labor market requirements in 
Spain, is due to the fact that, as the candidates with high level of education do not find a job 
in their level range, they opt to look for a job in vacancies that do not require a high or 
specific level of education. Therefore, many of the overqualified individuals with a tertiary 
education level end doing jobs that are more suitable for workers with upper-secondary level 
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education and, in turn, may force some workers with upper-secondary education to accept 
jobs below their qualification (Dolado et al., 2009), causing the low educated workers to 
suffer the highest rates of unemployment.  
 
The job matching theory (Mortensen, 1982) considers that the maladjustments between the 
level of education of the workers and the formation needs required by the vacancy emerge 
from the imperfect information of the labor market, that is, when the hiring process is taking 
place, the firm does not receive all the information from the candidate (his real productivity, 
expectations, motivation…) and even sometimes the candidate does not know everything 
about the vacancy he or she is applying to.  
 
2.2. Overqualification 
When studying the qualification mismatch, is the overqualification the problem that is more 
notorious in the Spanish labor market and its regions and that has been present for two 
decades now. The following table shows the number of total years of overqualification in the 
expansive phase (2004) of the economy in Catalonia.  
 
Table 1. Overqualification in Catalonia in 2004 
 
Source: Serracant, 2005. Data from the Institut d’Estadística de Catalunya (IDESCAT) 
 
In 2004, the 40,7% of the working population in Catalonia was overqualified with an average 
of 4,5 years of extra education received compared to the minimum required for the job. In 
global terms, the average Catalan worker had studied 1,3 years more than the required for his 
job in 2004. Therefore, it can be clearly seen that Catalonia has not a qualification mismatch 
problem in general, but an overqualification one. 
According to the OECD, Spain appeared to have the largest incidence of overqualification (at 
its maximum) and one of the highest averages on the general population over the 1990s and 
2000s, and the numbers have only increased.  
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Overqualification can be seen as the thrown away of time and monetary resources for the 
society as a whole because it emerges from the waste of the possible synergy between the 
educational and the managerial world.  
 
Alba-Ramirez (1993) proved that, in general, overqualification is not static, showing that in 
Spain the overqualified workers improve their match quality over time and that 
overqualification falls with age. There is extensive evidence about the overqualification being 
larger for youth than for adults (Crompton, 2002 and Dorn and Sousa-Poza, 2005). According 
to the Observatorio de Emancipación del Consejo de la Juventud de España (CJE) the 52,7% 
of the young workers (16-25 years old) are overqualified for the job they are performing.  
Moreover, not only does the age and the level of education influence; some studies have 
found that graduates of certain fields of education, such as humanities, are more likely to be 
overqualified than others (Silles and Dolton, 2002; Chevalier, 2003 and Wolbers, 2003), fact 
that points at the potentially important role played by career guidance and the education 
system in tackling overqualification. Gender is yet another variable that has an impact on 
overqualification; Catalan women are on average 4,25% more overqualified than man for the 
job they are performing (Idescat, 2004).  
 
2.3. Overqualification in temporary versus indefinite contracts 
The aim of this project is to look at whether and why the overqualification problem shows a 
different pattern in temporary compared to indefinite job positions. 
The Spanish labor reforms aiming at the unemployment reduction by lowering protection for 
temporary jobs and contracts (but without changing the permanent contracts protection) have 
encouraged the temporary hiring, incrementing the reluctance of the firms to convert these 
into permanent jobs (Bassanini and Duval, 2006). According to the OECD, Spain was one of 
the most restrictive countries in terms of protection legislation on permanent employment 
compared to the OECD countries in 2006, only surpassed by Portugal and Czech Republic 
(Going for Growth OECD, 2008). In 2009, about 25% of the total Spanish workers were 
hired on temporary contracts, which was more than double the OECD average (OECD, 
2010). Today this difference still exists with a 21% of temporary contracts in Spain and 
11,5% in the EU-28. The tendency towards temporary contracts among new workers, which 
are mostly young candidates and with a higher level of education than their previous 
generations, contribute to the increase of overqualification. It has been showed that working 
on a temporary contract has an effect on the likelihood of having job mismatch (Wolbers, 
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2003). Actually, in Spain, young workers employed in an indefinite contract have a 12,5% 
less probability to be overqualified compared to those that are employed in temporary 
contracts (Bancaja and Ivie, 2009).  
 
2.4. Assumptions about overqualification in the demand side 
Many previous studies (Sheppard and Herrick, 1972; House, 1974; Quinn and Shepard. 1974; 
Quinn and Mandilovitch, 1975 and Katcher, 2016) that have tried to clarify this aspect of the 
overqualification problem, have found that the following assumptions are present consciously 
or unconsciously in the employers’ or recruiting people’s mind: 
 
● At the beginning of the job, overqualified workers are more motivated and 
enthusiastic than those who are not, and bring new skills in the work group or firm 
● Hiring overqualified workers will upgrade the level of talent in a firm 
● Education enhances productivity; they are positively correlated, therefore a highly 
qualified worker will be more productive than a less-qualified worker.  
● Due to having a more trained learning capacity, overqualified workers can learn new 
tasks more easily and are more flexible to perform any task. 
● After a short period overqualified workers will be unmotivated, dissatisfied and bored 
because the tasks they are performing are below their intellectual capacities and skills. 
● Overqualified workers tend to quit the job sooner due to lack of motivation, no 
personal fulfillment or because they are given another job opportunity that better suits 
their qualifications.  
 
This project is not aiming at proving whether these previous assumptions are true or not, but 
at taking them into account and incorporating them in the model if they coincide with the 
results of the experiment and the answers of the surveyed firms.  
 
2.5. Response from the supply side to these assumptions 
The supply side of the labor market interacts and responds to the assumptions and 
expectations of the demand side. The first assumptions previously stated have been the cause 
of the perceived need of the candidates to increase their level of education in order to denote 
or try to quantify their abilities or skills to perform tasks (even when they do not require any 
specific level of education). Therefore, the economic theories of human capital and signaling 
should be considered.  
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The human capital theory was the first theory proposed that tried to formalize the relation 
between the level of education attained by individuals and its labor market situation. 
Previously, the education had only been seen as a consumption good rather than an 
investment. The “human capital” term has been constructed by the contributions of many 
different authors (Lewis, 1954; Mincer, 1958; Schultz, 1962 and Becker, 1964). The human 
capital theory states that individuals invest in their education to increment their knowledge 
and capacities in order to boost their productivity and subsequently be compensated in the 
labor market by an increase in wage or by a diminished risk of being unemployed. According 
to the theory, the high educated workers, and therefore more productive, should be employed 
in the high qualified and better paid jobs. However, as we have seen, some maladjustment 
occurs between the level of education of the workers and their job positions.  
Other theories have been developed after the human capital theory, but I will present the 
signaling theory as a crucial one that is very influential in the current labor market.  
In selection processes, the employer cannot directly observe the productivity of the candidate, 
only some attributes and characteristics such as his education, age, race, sex and previous 
work, among others. Of these observable attributes, some are fixed or immutable (called 
indices) while others can be subject to modifications (called signals). Education is a variable 
that an individual can modify over the years. The theory states that there are some costs 
attached to the acquisition of signals; for example, education is costly and the individual will 
invest on it if, and only if, there is sufficient return in his future possible wage to compensate 
this investment. Therefore, individuals will choose their signals in order to maximize the 
difference between signaling costs and compensation. Signaling costs should not be only seen 
in monetary terms but in a more broad perspective; for example, time is a signaling cost too 
(Spence, 1973). However, it is thought by the same author, Michael Spence, that signaling 
could bring negative implications to the market due to the fact that if individuals realize that 
the main selection criteria for firms is the level of education for the candidates -because it is 
thought to be a productivity credential-, they will keep investing in their education causing an 
increase in the level of education of the working population, which is, in fact, what has 
happened in the Catalan and Spanish labor market.  
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3. THE EXPERIMENT AND ITS RESULTS 
 
Constructing an answer for the research question is the aim of this and the following sections. 
To be able to present some relevant data, the scope of the experiment was by sector and 
geographically limited to the retail and restoration sectors in Catalonia.  
According to INE (Instituto Nacional de Estadística), the number of vacancies in the last 
trimester of 2015 in Spain were 58.868 and 91,0% of these were in the service sector. Inside 
the service sector, the retail and restoration subsectors, representing the 64,6% of the business 
volume and the 23,1% of the workers employed in the service sector in Spain, presents a 
higher proportion of overqualified workers compared to other services (Ivie and Bancaja, 
2009). This data is consistent with other previous studies that state that workers in the retail 
subsector are more likely to be overqualified (Silles and Dolton, 2002). Moreover, the retail 
and restoration subsector has an extensive amount of vacancies that do not require a high or 
specific level of education. Those stated facts are the reasons why the experiment was 
centered in the retail and restoration subsectors. Furthermore, the experiment was limited to 
Catalonia, where 312.000 people are employed in the retail subsector and where the service 
sector accumulates the 91,3% of the total vacancies (IDESCAT, 2015:4). 
 
The main objective of the experiment was to achieve significant results in order to be able to 
create a macroeconomic model that explains the behavior of the firms when performing 
selection processes. I decided to perform the experiment by presenting a questionnaire (the 
translated version of the original questionnaire can be found in the Appendix 8.1) to different 
retail and restoration firms with points of sale in Catalonia that could face the decision of 
which type of candidate (in terms of education) to hire for vacancies that do not require high 
or specific level of education according to the length of the vacancy.   
The experiment was initiated in the 5
th
 of January 2016 and it was closed the 9
th
 of April 
2016. In this period, 114 firms in the retail and restoration sector with points of sale in 
Catalonia were contacted in order to conduct the experiment (the list of the contacted firms 
can be found in the Appendix 8.2). A first contact with the firms was made through a 
telephone call, where I explained the project and invite them to participate in the experiment. 
Then, the questionnaire was presented to the Human Resources or Personnel Departments of 
the firms so that they could examine the type of questions asked and the information needed. 
Without being provided with any data, assumptions or hypotheses that could compromise or 
modify their answers, the firms had to answer it. 
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Moreover, during the same period, a complementary experiment was performed to temporary 
employment agencies located in Catalonia in order to have a more concrete view of the firms’ 
criteria when selecting candidates for temporary vacancies. A set of questions about hiring 
tendencies of retail firms was sent to 25 temporary employment agencies (the translated set of 
questions and the list of the contacted temporary employment agencies can be found in 
Appendix 8.3 and 8.4 respectively).  
 
3.1. Retail and restoration firms’ experiment results:   
The questionnaire was answered by 20 retail and restoration firms (a table with the general 
information of each surveyed firm can be found in the Appendix 8.5), the 17,5% of the total 
contacted. The results presented in this section are related to the total of 6.104 workers that 
are covering positions that do not require high or specific level of education at the points of 
sale in Catalonia of these 20 retail and restoration firms.  
The type of contract that prevails in the points of sale of the 20 firms is the indefinite 
contract, amounting up to the 75,4% of the total of contracts. The rest, 24,6%, are hired in 
temporary contracts.  
The experiment was focused on was the workers’ level of education, so a question asked the 
firms to choose 3 or 4 valuable characteristics among 11 proposed they would value in a 
candidate to cover a vacancy that does not require a high or specific level of education.  
 
Graph 3. Appreciated characteristics in candidates to cover a vacancy that does not require high or 
specific education by the surveyed retail and restoration firms:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration 
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“Customer service and communication skills” was the most valued characteristic, followed 
by “Mindset and responsibility”, “Previous work experience” and “Enthusiasm and 
willingness to work”. The 5th most valuable characteristic was “Education level” which was 
chosen by the 35% of the surveyed firms.  
The education level is not only a relevant characteristic that some of the surveyed firms value 
in their candidates, but for the 70% of them it is also a signal for the capacities that the 
candidate may have. The specific capacities that education level signals, according to the 
these 70%, are that candidates with higher education level adapt faster and better to changing 
situations, learn the tasks faster, have better customer service and communication skills and 
they have more willingness to learn and to perform better to improve their position inside the 
firm. However, the other 30% of the surveyed firms stated that the level of education is 
neither an indicator of the quality nor the productivity of the worker for these type of 
vacancies. 
 
The experiment aims at studying the hiring strategies according to the temporality of the 
contract or position to be covered, therefore, a question was designed to obtain data about the 
percentage of overqualified workers in temporary contracts compared to those with indefinite 
contracts. The 20% of the surveyed firms could not respond to this question due to not having 
a complete enough databases about the employees. However, the results of the 16 firms that 
could answer it showed that 58% of the temporary workers are overqualified for the position 
they are covering while only the 27,8% of the workers with indefinite contract are.   
 
Graph 4. Overqualified workers with temporary and indefinite contracts in the points of sale of the 
surveyed firms: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration. Results of 16 retail and restoration surveyed firms.  
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When asked about the probability of a temporary vacancy being converted into an indefinite 
vacancy (assuming the candidate is good), the 75% of the surveyed firms considered the 
probability that a temporary contract could be converted into an indefinite contract.  The 
probability for all of them was between the 80%-90%. The other 25% of the firms considered 
the probability of a temporary position (not a temporary contract) being converted into an 
indefinite position. In this case, the result was that only around the 30% of workers hired 
specifically for a temporary position were then converted into indefinite workers in that 
position that become indefinite due to the concrete needs that were being covered. 
Furthermore, the 65% of the surveyed firms would not consider the level of education as a 
very relevant characteristic to take into account when deciding to hire a candidate for a 
temporary position that has a high probability that is converted into an indefinite position, 
they would consider other factors first. If the probability was high, the 20% would choose a 
candidate that is not overqualified for the concern that an overqualified candidate would 
leave the company after a short period when being offered a more suitable job in another 
firm. The other 15% would choose a candidate that has a high level of education because of 
the positive capacities that are associated to it and because, if the worker was good, they 
would then move him or her another position inside the firm.  
 
In terms of the negative aspects or consequences of hiring an overqualified candidate, the 
85% of the surveyed firms mentioned the quitting of the job causing a high staff turnover 
inside the firm, being directly related to the high number of overqualified workers in 
temporary vacancies. The 40% also mentioned the demotivation and dissatisfaction of the 
overqualified worker.    
 
3.2. Temporary employment agencies’ experiment results:  
The complementary experiment consisted in contacting 25 temporary employment agencies 
in Catalonia, however only the 20% of those answered the three questions related to the 
tendencies of the retail firms when asking the agencies to look for candidates to fill a 
temporary vacancy that does not require a high or specific level of education. The answers to 
the questions for each temporary employment agency can be found in the Appendix 8.6. 
 
All the 5 surveyed temporary employment agencies reached the same conclusion when being 
asked which type of candidate (in terms of education) a retail firm would choose to cover a 
temporary vacancy that does not require a high or specific level of education. They answered 
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that if the vacancy is temporary (and not extended for a long period of time), retail firms 
would choose a candidate with high level of education because he or she would learn faster. 
Although the job offers that the retail firms process through the temporary employment 
agencies do not specify nor demand a concrete level of education for a vacancy that does not 
require it, temporary employment agencies agreed it is an element they analyze.  
The probability of a temporary vacancy being converted into an indefinite vacancy is a 
relevant factor when doing the selection process. According to the temporary employment 
agencies, when the retail firms know that the probability is high, they opt for candidates with 
the level of education required, and never overqualified candidates, to avoid the worker 
demotivation and the early quitting.  
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4. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
 
Before commenting the results achieved through the experiment, some general aspects of it 
are going to be explained. The values obtained in the experiment cannot be generalized due to 
the fact that a high bias could exist. Only 17,5% of the contacted retail and restoration firms 
responded the questionnaire and the 20,0% of the contacted temporary employment agencies 
responded the three questions, fact that could cause a distortion in the conclusions reached. 
We need to have in mind that the firms that were willing to participate in the experiment 
could be firms with common characteristics that tend to behave in a certain way and they 
could be prone to have different hiring strategies to those that did not respond the 
questionnaire.  
Moreover, the selection of firms made through the criteria explained before (they were retail 
and restoration firms with points of sale in Catalonia) is going to directly influence the 
conclusions due to the fact that those are not going to refer to the whole demand side of the 
labor market in Catalonia nor Spain.   
 
From the experiment carried out, it can be seen that the distribution of contracts between 
temporary and indefinite is not very different to that of the whole retail and restoration 
sectors in Catalonia. While the average percentage of indefinite contracts in the 20 surveyed 
firms was 75,4%, the average percentage of the retail and restoration sectors in Catalonia 
amounts up to 78,4% (in the first trimester of 2016). On the contrary, the percentage of 
temporary contracts is higher in the sample, with a 24,6%, than the average of the retail and 
restoration sectors in Catalonia, with a 21,6%. Although a slight difference is perceived 
between the experiment sample and the general values for the sector, neither of those 
converge to European levels. The EU-28 average percentage of temporary contracts is of 
11,5% according to Eurostat.  
 
Table 2. Occupation by type of contract in the first trimester of 2016:  
 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration with EPA (Idescat and INE) and EUROSTAT data 
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Regarding the level of education, it is the 5
th
 most relevant characteristic out of 11 that retail 
and restoration firms value in candidates to cover a vacancy that does not require high or 
specific education. The reason of such position is the fact that the 70% of the surveyed firms 
value the level of education as a signal for the capacities that the candidate may have. In the 
questionnaires, the reasoning for this response was that candidates with high level of 
education: 
- Tend to adapt better and learn the tasks faster 
- Are willing to work harder, to learn more and be promoted 
- Have better communication skills 
These arguments fit with the assumptions presented in the section 2.4 of the project:  
- Due to having a more trained learning capacity, overqualified workers can learn new 
tasks more easily and are more flexible to perform any task. 
- Education enhances productivity; they are positively correlated, therefore a highly 
qualified worker will be more productive than a less-qualified worker.  
However, according to the surveyed firms, not everything about a candidate with high level 
of education for a vacancy that does not require a high level of education is positive. The 
85% of them mentioned the quitting of the job causing a higher turnover inside the firm as a 
negative aspect of hiring an overqualified employee, being directly related to the high number 
of overqualified workers in temporary vacancies. Furthermore, the 40% of the surveyed firms 
mentioned the demotivation and dissatisfaction of the overqualified worker. 
The arguments against hiring overqualified workers also fit with the other assumptions 
presented in the section 2.4:  
- After a short period overqualified workers will be unmotivated, dissatisfied and bored 
because the tasks they are performing are below their intellectual capacities and skills. 
- Overqualified workers tend to quit the job sooner due to lack of motivation, no 
personal fulfillment or because they have found another job opportunity that better 
suits their qualifications.  
The overqualification affects the 58% of the temporary workers of the surveyed firms, while 
it only affects the 27,8% of the indefinite workers. Therefore, there is an average of 35,2% of 
overqualified employees in the points of sale in Catalonia of the 16 retail and restoration 
firms that could answer the question related to the overqualification of their employees. This 
value is very high compared to the whole Spanish labor market average of overqualified 
workers (31%) and much higher than the EU average (19%) that were published in 2011 by 
Eurostat. This values could indicate the increasing tendency of firms to prefer candidates with 
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high level of education for the vacancies, however, as they tend to leave sooner, only the 
candidates that are not overqualified for the position would be the ones staying until being 
converted into indefinite workers. These values could also have another interpretation, they 
could show the tendency of the candidates with high level of education to search only for 
temporary positions when the vacancy does not require high or specific level of education 
because they intend to leave the firm soon or quit when they find a better job opportunity 
according to their level of education. These values are consistent with the previous studies 
mentioned in the section 3.3 of the project which state that temporary positions increases the 
risk of qualification mismatch.  
The probability of a temporary worker being converted into an indefinite worker is high (80-
90%) if the worker is good, because most of the firms follow the common pattern of 1 year in 
temporary contract and then, automatically, the worker is converted into indefinite due to the 
current labor legislation. If we consider the temporary positions (those only created for a 
specific period of time, such as an extra worker in a shop for sales season), the probability of 
this job position being converted into an indefinite one is much lower, 30% on average.  
From that question regarding the convertibility of a temporary position into an indefinite one, 
it could be seen that most of the companies do not distinguish between temporary workers 
and temporary positions; the firms assume it is the same concept. It must be understood that a 
temporary worker can be covering an indefinite position and then it can be discussed whether 
he or she should become indefinite. However, in general terms, the temporary position 
appears with the temporary needs of the firm (although it can become indefinite if, for 
example, the increase in demand that first seemed temporary then becomes permanent), and it 
can be covered by workers who, if they are good, may become an indefinite worker for the 
firm in another type of vacancy.  
When having to choose between a candidate with high level of education or low level of 
education for a temporary vacancy that does not require a high or specific level of education 
and that has high probability that it is converted into an indefinite position, 65% of the firms 
did not choose between any of them arguing that it would depend on the other characteristics 
of the worker and that his or her level of education would not be a relevant factor to make 
this decision. Another 20% of the surveyed firms would choose a candidate with low level of 
education, not overqualified, due to the fact that there is a high probability that the worker 
would leave the company early when he or she received a more suitable job offer. The other 
15% would choose a candidate with high level of education, arguing that he would probably 
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be more capable of learning new tasks with the possibility of being promoted to more 
complex positions that would require his or her level of education.  
Although a general conclusion about the preferences of the firms when hiring a candidate for 
a temporary position with a high probability of being converted into indefinite cannot be 
made due to the disparities of the answers, with the answers to the other questions jointly 
with the arguments to this question, a tendency towards a hiring strategy can be perceived.  
 
With the information of the answers of the retail and restoration firms and the results of the 
temporary employment agencies questionnaires, it can be inferred that, in general, when the 
vacancy is temporary and lasts for a short time span, retail and restoration firms prefer a 
candidate with high level of education because of the positive connotations and consequences 
it brings. When the vacancy is temporary but has a high probability of converting into an 
indefinite job position, restoration and retail firms prefer a candidate with the level of 
education required (not more than the required), because they fear the early quitting of the 
worker, leaving them with an empty vacancy that needs to be covered again. Finally, if the 
vacancy is indefinite, although they would rather the candidates had the qualities of the 
worker with high level of education, they would opt for a candidate with reasonable or low 
level of education in order to ensure a long term commitment of the worker with the company 
assuming that a higher level of productivity is going to be reached in the following periods 
thanks to the in-the-job training and learning process.  
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5. THEORY 
 
In this section, a partial equilibrium achieved through a positive theory encompassing the 
results and the analysis of the experiment is going to be presented. The theory created is a 
positive theory and not a normative one, therefore, it aims at explaining the reality and not at 
expressing whether the firms’ hiring strategies are desirable or not.  
 
As widely agreed and understood, the main goal for a firm is to maximize its profits. 
In a market where firms live for infinite periods it is important to take into consideration not 
only the current period, but also the future periods. Therefore, the aim for a firm would not 
only be to maximize the profits for the first period (π1), but also the profits for the future 
periods (denoted by βπ2), which could be written as follows: 
max. π1 + βπ2 
This formula could also be used to maximize the profits obtained of a job position. I am using 
this interpretation of the equation in order to create the theory.  If it is an indefinite position, 
the goal will be to maximize the profits for all the periods. However, the maximization 
problem changes when we are only interested in the current period. We would be talking, in 
this case about a temporary position, which exists only for one period. Then, the problem 
could be written as follows:  
max.  π1 
 
First, it is important to understand which would be the profits for a firm if the vacancy is 
covered by a worker with high or low level of education. It could be written as follows:   
 
 
 
Where:  
i = the type of worker   iϵ{l,h} where “l” refers to workers with low level of education 
and “h” to workers with high level of education 
y = expected productivity of a worker. y = Ei(y)  
t = period 
?̅? = the wage paid. It is fixed because it is assumed that the wage is given and no 
negotiations are done in the selection and hiring process 
β = weight of future periods. The intertemporal discount factor 
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α = probability of the temporary position being converted into an indefinite position 
after the first period. If the position is temporary, lasting only for the first period, then 
α = 0. If the position is indefinite since the beginning, then α = 1. 
λ = quitting rate of the worker 
J
I
 = the firm’s future profit in the following period if the position is Indefinite.  
 
 
If after the first period a job position is converted into an indefinite position, the future 
periods are all the same as the second period, therefore, to simplify the equation, only two 
periods are going to be considered. Then β = 0, therefore,   
 
The equation encompassing all the elements would be:  
 
 
 
where (𝑦𝑖
1 −  ?̅?)  are the profits for the firm from in period 1 and worker i (𝜋𝑖
1) 
and  (𝑦𝑖
2 −  ?̅?)  are the profits for the firm in period 2 from the worker i (𝜋𝑖
2) 
 
Once the equation is constructed, the problem the firm is facing can be analyzed. The 
problem of the firm is whether a low qualified worker or a high qualified worker for a 
vacancy that does not require a high or specific level of education should be hired:    
max. {Jl , Jh} 
 
To simplify, I am assuming that the candidates do not differ in anything but for their level of 
education (all the other variables are fixed) to study if differences in the hiring strategies exist 
between candidates with high level of education or low level of education for either indefinite 
or temporary jobs. 
 
To be able to develop this model and simplify it, I am going to use some assumptions, which 
were previously stated in the section 2.4 and later stated by the surveyed firms:  
 
EFFECT OF THE CANDIDATES’ LEVEL OF EDUCATION ON FIRMS’ HIRING STRATEGIES 
 
24 
 
First assumption: candidates with higher education level have higher expected productivity. 
(yh > yl)  The level of education acts as a proxy of the expected productivity  
 Education enhances productivity; they are positively correlated, therefore a highly 
qualified worker will be more productive than a less-qualified worker. 
Second assumption: candidates with higher education level have higher probability of leaving 
the job after the first period (λh > λl)  
 After a short period overqualified workers will be unmotivated, dissatisfied and bored 
because the tasks they are performing are below their intellectual capacities and skills, 
causing a decrease in their productivity. 
 Overqualified workers tend to quit the job sooner due to lack of motivation, no 
personal fulfillment or because they are given another job opportunity that better suits 
their qualifications.    
 
Therefore, looking at the equation and taking into account the assumptions, it can be inferred 
that the optimal maximization of benefits for the firm would be:  
 
- For temporary jobs, the firm wants to max.  π1. According to the model, only J= yi-w̅   
has to be taken into account because α = 0. Therefore, the firm is going to choose the 
H candidate
1
 as long as yh > yl  
- For indefinite jobs, the firm wants to max. π1 + βπ2. According to the model,   
Ji =  yi
1 −  w̅ +  β[α[(1 − λi)(yi
2 − w̅)]] has to be taken into account with α=1. Therefore, 
the firm is going to choose the L candidate when λh > λl  and the yh ~ yl, or when the L 
candidate can reach a similar level of productivity as the H candidate after a short 
period of in-the-job training . The firm is only going to choose the H candidate when 
the yh is much bigger than yl, even if λh > λl.  
- For temporary vacancies that have some probability to be converted into indefinite 
vacancies (0<α<1), the firm is going to choose the candidate looking it as a tradeoff; 
weighting if a lower productivity can compensate the uncertainty of the worker 
leaving in the following period. If α is high, the firm is going to choose an L 
candidate, whereas if α is rather low, the firm is going to choose an H candidate.  
 
                                                 
1
 “H candidate” is going to be used to refer to a candidate with high level of education and “L candidate” to 
refer to a candidate with low level of education 
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To have a better understanding of this tradeoff that the firm is facing, a graphical 
representation is going to be presented. It is needed to fix some values in order to represent 
the indifference curve. I am going to assume β = 1, therefore the future period weights the 
same as the first period. Moreover, the wage, which is not negotiated, is going to be fixed at 
w̅= 0,8. Then, λl = 0,05, because it is assumed that workers with low level of education have a 
low probability of leaving the firm, and finally, the productivity of the worker with low level 
of education is going to be normalized at yl = 1. Due to the assumptions used in the model, 
the productivity of the worker with high level of education (yh) is going to be higher than the 
productivity of the worker with low level of education (yl). Also, to simplify the 
representation, the productivity between periods is the same for both types of workers. 
(𝑦𝑖
1 =  𝑦𝑖
2 = 𝑦𝑖). Substituting every variable by the given value, the equation evolves into:   
𝑦ℎ =  
1 +  𝛼 − 0.8𝛼𝜆ℎ
1 + 𝛼 −  𝛼𝜆ℎ
 
 
Now, a comparative statics is presented to see the difference in the problem the firm is facing 
when the probability of the temporary position being converted into an indefinite position is 
α=0.3 (answered by the 25% of the surveyed firms when thinking about the probability a 
temporary position is converted into an indefinite position) and α=0.85 (answered by the 75% 
of the surveyed firms when thinking about the probability that a temporary worker is 
converted into an indefinite worker).  
 
Graph 5. Comparative statics of the firm’s tradeoff with different α 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                         α=0.3                                                                       α=0.85 
Source: own elaboration 
 
h h 
l 
l 
𝑦ℎ − 𝑦𝑙  𝑦ℎ − 𝑦𝑙  
𝜆ℎ − 𝜆𝑙 𝜆ℎ − 𝜆𝑙 
EFFECT OF THE CANDIDATES’ LEVEL OF EDUCATION ON FIRMS’ HIRING STRATEGIES 
 
26 
 
The firm is going to choose a candidate with high level of education as long as its 
expectations about the worker’s productivity and quitting rate are positioned in the dark green 
area or “h” area. Instead, the firm is going to choose a candidate with low level of education 
if the expectations are positioned in the light green area or “l” area. The line that divides both 
areas is the indifference curve, where the firm is indifferent between hiring a candidate with 
high or with low level of educations given the expectations that it has over them.  
This graphical representation enables to see that when the probability that a temporary 
position is converted into an indefinite position grows, the area where the firm chooses a 
candidate with low level of education also grows. Nevertheless, even a small increase in 
productivity makes that firms prefer to hire a candidate with high level of education.   
Again, we cannot generalize this graphical representation because many assumptions have 
been made. Probably, the picture would have been different if the productivity of each period 
was not equal. According to the assumptions and prejudices of the firms, the productivity of 
candidates with high level of education would shrink over time due to lack of motivation and 
satisfaction, and the productivity of candidates with low level of education would increase 
because of the in-the-job training and to the learning process, causing an enlargement of the 
light green area or “l” area.  
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The mismatch problem and especially the overqualificaition problem is of high magnitude in 
the Spanish and Catalan labor market, and the experiment performed in a small sample of 
Catalan retail and restoration firms supports this statement although its results cannot be 
generalized because some biases could exist. 
It can be inferred from the results of the experiment and the partial equilibrium achieved 
through the macroeconomic theory that the hiring strategies of the surveyed retail and 
restoration firms, encourage and deepen the problem of overqualification in vacancies that do 
not require a high or specific level of education because of the existent assumptions and 
prejudices. If this pattern described by the macroeconomic theory is followed by all the 
different business sectors for job positions that do not require high or specific level of 
education, it is no wonder why the average level of overqualification is extremely high for 
temporary positions both in Catalonia and Spain and also relevant for indefinite positions.    
The extremely high overqualification levels in temporary positions could be a not very 
important problem for the economy as a whole if the percentage of the temporary contracts 
was inferior. However, Spain, as well as Catalonia (with an average of 24,8% and 21% 
respectively of temporary contracts in 2015), is very far from converging to European levels 
(with an average of 11,5% of temporary contracts for the EU-28). 
As proved in the macroeconomic theory presented, the level of education of the candidate is 
determinant in the selection process of the firms that follow the same hiring strategies as the 
surveyed firms due to the assumptions that are made by those firms. It could also be stated 
that they are not only assumptions but prejudices, because there is still no generally accepted 
study that proves a direct positive correlation between the level of education and the level of 
productivity of a worker, although some studies have partially proven so in some specific 
developing countries (Jones, 2001). 
The responses from the surveyed firms fit with the previous empirical data and also the 
assumptions that previous authors detected in the labor market. Temporary positions have a 
higher probability of suffering from qualification mismatches compared to indefinite 
positions, which is the result of the combination of both positive and negative expectations of 
hiring overqualified workers to cover vacancies that do not require a high or specific level of 
education. Firms prefer a candidate that has a high level of education because there is the 
general thought that education enhances productivity and that due to having a more trained 
learning capacity, overqualified workers can learn new tasks more easily and are more 
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flexible to perform any task. However, the negative connotations associated to them such as 
the workers’ demotivation, dissatisfaction and boredom because the tasks they are performing 
are below their intellectual capacities and skills or their tendency to quit the job sooner due to 
this lack of motivation and no personal fulfillment or because they are given another job 
opportunity that better suits their qualifications, cause the firms to prefer to choose an 
overqualified candidate only for temporary positions and choose a candidate that is not 
overqualified for indefinite positions or for temporary positions that have a high probability 
of being converted into indefinite ones. 
Moreover, from the answers of the questionnaires, it can be seen that the level of education of 
a worker act as a signal of his or her capacities rather than his or her knowledge for firms that 
are looking for a candidate to cover a vacancy that does not require a high or specific level of 
education. Firms only value the level of education that the candidate possesses rather than the 
area of knowledge he or she is specialized in. It could be said that education is used as a 
proxy for the expected productivity.   
Furthermore, performing the experiment, it can be perceive that some firms wrongly consider 
the term temporary job position as a synonym for temporary contract.  
  
To finalize the project, I would like to mention that there are not many studies nor data 
available about the overqualification problem regarding specific sectors of the economy. The 
original geographic limitations chosen to perform the experiment (Vic, a city of 42.498 
inhabitants in the province of Barcelona) had to be changed to the whole Catalan retail and 
restoration subsectors due to the non-existent empirical data about the general facts of 
overqualification in Vic.  However, and although data could be found about Catalonia, there 
is plenty of room to enlarge the databases and the information about it. Therefore, this project 
could be further developed once more statistics are published about every sector of the 
economy and could be further complemented by enlarging the sample of the experiment to 
achieve more relevant results for the whole economy.  
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Total number of employees 
 
Total number of employees working in the points of sale in Catalonia 
Are there job positions in the points of sale that do not require high nor specific levels of 
education? If so, which type of job position? 
 
 
Percentage of temporary employees in the points of sale 
 
Percentage of indefinite employees in the points of sale 
Choose 3 or 4 characteristics that you value in a candidate for a vacancy that does not require a 
high or specific level of education in your point of sale 
 
Aptitudes for team work  Flexibility 
Availability   Good presence 
Customer service and 
communication skills 
 Language (s) 
 
Education 
 Mindset and responsibility 
 
Enthusiasm and willingness 
to work 
 Previous work experience 
 
Recommendations 
   
 Do you value the level of education of a candidate as a signal for the capacities that the worker 
may have?  
 
 
 
 
8. APPENDIX 
 
Appendix 8.1: Retail and restoration firms’ questionnaire: 
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Probability that a temporary vacancy is converted into an indefinite vacancy 
 
If the probability that a temporary vacancy is converted into an indefinite vacancy is high, would 
you prefer a candidate with high level of education or low level of education for a vacancy that 
does not require high nor specific level of education? Why? 
 
 
 
If you think there are negative aspects of hiring an overqualified candidate (a candidate that has a 
level of education higher than the one required for the job position), which would they be?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Percentage of temporary workers that have a level of education higher than the required for their 
job position in your points of sale 
Percentage of indefinite workers that have a level of education higher than the required for their 
job position in your points of sale 
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Appendix 8.2: List of the contacted retail and restoration firms (the surveyed firms are 
highlighted in bold) 
100 MONTADITOS FARGGI NOSTRUM 
ABACUS FEIXES AULET O’PAN 
AREAS DE ALIMENTACION FES MÉS PADEVÍ 
BASE FONTVISOCKS PANCHITO 
BAUHAUS FOOTLOCKER PANS &COMPANY 
BENETTON FOSTER’S HOLLYWOOD PARFOIS 
BIBA FUREST PAVIC 
BISSÚ GRANIER PEACOCK  
BLANCO GRANJA ARMENGOL PEIXOS POVEDANO 
BON AREA GROS MERCAT PINTUR 
BON PREU GRUP CARRERA PLANA DE VIC 
BOSANOVA HAPPY PILLS PLANELLES DONAT 
BROWNIE IBERICUS PRINK 
CAL ISERN IKEA PROGRÉS SABATERIES 
CAMPER IMAGINARIUM PUNT FRESC 
CAPRABO  INSIDE PUNT ROMA 
CASA JUGUETTOS PUNTO BLANCO 
CASA AMETLLER KÖNIG QUEROL 
CASA TIO LA BURUGESA RAQUEL SALA 
CASAS SABATERIAS LA CROSSANDRA SAUS FRUITERIES 
CLAREL LA SIRENA SEPHORA 
CONDIS LEROY MERLIN SERVIFRUIT 
CONSUM LIDL SHANA 
COQUES PERAFITA LIZARRAN SMÖOY 
CORTEFIEL LLAGURT SUBWAY 
CULIMARIUM LLAOLLAO SUPAN 
DESIGUAL MANGO SUPERVERD 
DINO MARLO’S SYSTEM ACTION 
DOUGLAS MARYPAZ TAGLIATELLA 
DRIM MASRAMON TASCÓN 
DRUNI MC DONALDS TEXTURA 
EL MUSSOL MEDIA MARKT THE BODY SHOP 
EL RACÓ MERKAL CALZADOS TNC 
ENRIQUE TOMAS MERKAMUEBLE VIENA 
EQUIVALENZA MISAKO VINALIUM 
EseOese MOYCOR VIVES 
ETAM MUY MUCHO WOMAN’SECRET 
EUREKAKIDS NATURA YAMAMAY 
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Appendix 8.3: Temporary employment agencies’ questionnaire: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If retail firms are presented with two candidates to choose from to cover a temporary 
vacancy that does not require a high or specific level of education, would they choose a 
candidate with high level of education or low level of education?  Why? 
 
In the job offers of retail firms for vacancies that do not require high or specific level of 
education, do they ask for high level of education or education requirements? 
 
 
 
 
Which is the probability that a temporary vacancy is converted into an indefinite vacancy? 
Does this probability influence in the selection process in relation to the education level of 
the candidate? How?   
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Appendix 8.4: List of the contacted temporary employment agencies (the surveyed firms are 
highlighted in bold) 
 
ADECCO TT 
AGENCIA PENELOPE ETT 
AGIOGLOBAL 
ANANDA TRABAJO TEMPORAL 
ASCENDENT ETT 
AXXON 
CATALANA DE TREBALL 
DEKRA EMPLEO 
EPOS 
EUROFIRMS 
GI GROUP 
GRUPO ACENDENT STAFF ETT 
GRUPO ALLIANCE 
GRUPO FASTER IBÉRICA  
INTAC VIC 
MANPOWER 
MASTER WORK 
MEDITEMPUS 
PRO WORK SELECTION 
SELECCIÓN Y TRABAJO  
SELECTIVA 
SYNERGIE 
TEMPJOB ETT 
TT TREBALL TEMPORAL 
VALESTA ES 
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Appendix 8.5: Basic information of the 20 surveyed retail and restoration firms:  
 
Commercial name/brand Company name CIF Dimension  Number of points   Number of employees in  
      
(number of 
employees) 
of sale in 
Catalonia points of sale in Catalonia 
BISSÚ BISU BAGS, SL B65967762 20 7 12 
BON AREA CORPORACION ALIMENTARIA GUISSONA, SA A25445131 3500 368 1500 
CASA AMETLLER CASA AMETLLER, SL B62591359 887 82 826 
CASA TIÓ UNIÓ INTEGRAL ALIMENTÀRIA, SA A63371082 113 15 90 
ENRIQUE TOMÁS ENRIQUE TOMÁS, SL B59544957 420 54 398 
EUREKAKIDS DAMERIK, SL B17571589  130 30 90 
FONTVISOCKS FONTVISOCKS, SL B61248548 27 7 25 
FOSTER'S HOLLYWOOD FOOD SERVICE PROJECT, SL B82798943 8727 23 986 
GRANJA ARMENGOL GRANJA ARMENGOL 39237070J 33 22 30 
KÖNIG KG GIRONA, SL B55060016 240 8 30 
LA CROSSANDRA PASTISSERIA CROSSANDRA, SL B63042501 19 3 19 
LLAGURT RAHOLA I SALOMÓ, SL B55093140 55 24 52 
MERKAL CALZADOS MERKAL CALZADOS, SL B63266969 1250 61 315 
PADEVÍ PADEVI, SA A08653577 10 4 10 
PAVIC PAVIC, SA A08099897 145  21 78 
PEACOCK CALÇATS PEACOCK, SL B17304239 38 13 34 
PLANELLES DONAT PLANELLES DONAT, SL A58723453 13 4 10 
QUEROL QUEVEL, SL B08957896 96 28 88 
SAUS FRUITERIES FRUITERIES VILLALTA-SAUS, SL B62188115 11 4 7 
VIENA ESTABLIMENTS VIENA, SA A08874489 1500 45 1462 
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Appendix 8.6: Temporary employment agencies’ questionnaires’ answers 
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